The Ethics of Procreation and the Rational Acceptance of Life: A Critical Engagement with Weinberg’s Argument
Introduction
Is it ever morally justifiable to bring a new life into the world, given the inevitable suffering that life entails? This question, ancient in its origin and sharpened by modern ethical theory, is taken up by Rivka Weinberg in her nuanced engagement with procreative ethics. Building on Rawlsian principles of justice and responding to the nonidentity problem famously articulated by Derek Parfit, Weinberg proposes a criterion for the moral permissibility of procreation: a person may justifiably choose to have a child only if they intend to nurture that child and can reasonably believe that the risk they impose by creating that life would be rational for the child to accept—specifically, if they would rationally accept it in exchange for the opportunity to one day make the same procreative choice themselves.
This essay explores the implications and assumptions of Weinberg’s argument. It examines how her approach addresses the nonidentity problem, investigates the role of risk and rational consent in procreative decisions, and evaluates the moral significance she assigns to procreative autonomy. It also raises critical questions about the conceptual leap between accepting life and valuing reproduction, and whether the opportunity to procreate is meaningful enough to justify the burdens of existence.
Weinberg’s Proposal: Procreation as Rational Risk
Weinberg seeks to resolve a dilemma at the heart of procreative ethics: how can we justify imposing life on someone who cannot consent to it in advance, particularly when that life is guaranteed to include suffering, uncertainty, and mortality? Drawing on Rawls’ veil of ignorance—a thought experiment in which principles of justice are determined without knowledge of one’s own place in society—Weinberg asks the prospective parent to engage in a kind of moral role-reversal. They must imagine themselves in the position of the future child, behind a veil of temporal ignorance. Would they agree to be born under the risks and conditions they are about to impose?
The justification, according to Weinberg, rests on two conditions: (1) the procreator must intend to care for and nurture the child; and (2) the procreator must believe that the child would rationally accept the risks of being born because doing so grants them the opportunity to exercise procreative autonomy later in life. The child, if able to reason from this hypothetical standpoint, should be able to say: “Yes, I accept being born into this world, with its difficulties, because I will have the meaningful opportunity to choose whether to have children of my own.”
This argument attempts to circumvent the nonidentity problem, which Parfit formulates as the difficulty of claiming that someone has been harmed by being born when, had they not been born, they would not exist at all. Weinberg sidesteps this by shifting the focus from harm to justification. Rather than asking whether birth harms the child, she asks whether the act of creation is morally justifiable from the standpoint of the future person’s rational interests.
The Central Assumption: Procreation as a Justifying Good
A critical feature of Weinberg’s argument is the idea that the opportunity to procreate is a sufficiently valuable good—valuable enough to balance or justify the risks of suffering and death that come with existence. In this sense, her position places enormous moral weight on procreative autonomy: the idea that choosing to create life is a meaningful and worthwhile component of human freedom and agency.
But this assumption is not uncontroversial. While many people may indeed find meaning in parenthood, not all do. Moreover, the opportunity to procreate is a contingent good: it is only valuable to those who (a) survive to reproductive age, (b) retain the capacity to reproduce, and (c) actually desire to do so. Thus, building the justification of birth on such a conditional and subjective value raises a deep ethical question: can the hypothetical future value of procreation justify imposing the full weight of life’s risks, even on those who may never want to reproduce?
The Missing Step: Accepting Life Before Valuing It
One of the most striking challenges to Weinberg’s argument is the logical leap it seems to make. Her test assumes that the opportunity to procreate is a good that makes life worth starting. But this bypasses a crucial step: the initial acceptance of life itself. Before the child can appreciate procreative autonomy, they must first survive and come to terms with the conditions of existence—pain, loss, finitude. The parent must therefore imagine not only a child who might want children but, more importantly, a child who would be willing to take on the basic challenge of being alive. The core of the problem is not procreation per se, but the deeper metaphysical and existential question: is life, under these conditions, a rational thing to wish upon someone?
Weinberg’s framework does not ignore this entirely—she speaks of “reasonable risks” and avoids assuming that any life is automatically worth starting. But the emphasis on future procreative choice still shifts the conversation from whether life itself is good, to whether it contains a certain kind of freedom. This opens her view to criticism: is the value of reproductive freedom truly so foundational that it can render life’s unchosen burdens justifiable?
Alternative Views: Antinatalism and Other Challenges
This critique resonates strongly with antinatalist positions, such as those of David Benatar. In Better Never to Have Been, Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm. His asymmetry argument suggests that while the absence of pain is good (even if no one benefits from it), the absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one to miss it. From this view, procreation imposes suffering without consent and cannot be justified by potential goods—especially goods like procreative autonomy, which depend on the very life in question.
Others, like Seana Shiffrin, have argued that the nonconsensual imposition of life violates basic liberal values about bodily and personal autonomy. Even if life can be good, it doesn’t follow that it is just to force it on someone without their agreement.
Conversely, some thinkers defend procreation as a basic expression of human love, trust, or hope. Christine Overall, for instance, emphasizes the relational and embodied aspects of choosing to create life—not as a calculation of risks and payoffs, but as a moral and emotional commitment to the future. These perspectives offer a more positive view of life, suggesting that the value of existence may not be reducible to abstract principles of rational justification.
Conclusion: Risk, Responsibility, and the Ethics of Creation
Weinberg’s argument offers a sophisticated framework for evaluating the morality of procreation in a world where suffering is real and consent is impossible. Her emphasis on procreative autonomy reflects a deep commitment to respecting the future person’s agency and rationality. Yet the argument is vulnerable to the concern that it treats the opportunity to reproduce as a stand-in for the value of life itself—and that this risks justifying birth on too narrow a foundation.
Ultimately, Weinberg challenges us to take procreative responsibility seriously. Her approach insists that those who create life must do so with awareness of the risks they impose and the goods they hope to provide. Whether or not we accept her test, the questions she raises are unavoidable: What makes a life worth beginning? And who gets to decide?
References
Benatar, D. (2006). Better never to have been: The harm of coming into existence. Oxford University Press.
Overall, C. (2012). Why have children? The ethical debate. MIT Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press.
Shiffrin, S. V. (1999). Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm. Legal Theory, 5(2), 117–148.
Weinberg, R. (2015). The risk of a lifetime: How, when, and why procreation may be permissible. Oxford University Press.